Der Himmel über Berlin- Wings of Desire

Heidegger Speaks. Part 1. English subtitled.

Manuel De Landa. Metaphysics As Ontology: Aristotle and Deleuze's Realis...

23. Heidegger's Being and Time.

On Ethics

John Rawls credits modern science, the establishment of modern democratic state and the proliferation of institutionalized religion as the contributing factors behind the major political events at the turn of 20^th century, not only in Europe and America but also in many other parts of the world. Fragmentation of responsibility is one outcome of the establishment of democratic state institutions. Another significant change is rejection of objective truth in regarding objective truth as synonymous with ‘commands’ from structures of belief mainly institutionalized religion and mythic concept of the ‘nation state’. Modern scientific advancements enhanced technological intimacy and physical distance. This further supported in augmenting a spiral of belief sans objectivity without any sharing of responsibility by individuals. All this amounted to a mass dehumanization and destruction in the shape of two major world wars in the 20^th century.

Arendt explores the moral roots of these events in order to ‘reconcile’ with this horrendous past. The problem she cites is that we are still not able to prosecute the criminals among us who were responsible for such destruction or who are still continuing with such acts because of the nature of these crimes. The crimes here were rooted in passive ‘obedience’ to an authority which has violence inbuilt in it, a state which allows systemic violence to its own subjects and those who silently obeyed it and were accussed for actions for which they do not hold the responsibility which resulted in evading any moral discussion about them. The intention for these criminal actions was not individual hatred or enmity but obedience to a system of rules based on ‘belief’. The negation of all values in form of passive obedience to laws in such circumstances is very problematic.

There are significant moral questions that arise from this context:

1. Is there any meaningful distinction between morality and ethics? Arendt locates different roots for these two terms: Ethics with Greek roots and Morality with Latin roots. Moral is concerned with obedience of commands/laws of land or divine commands. Morality is based on the assumption of self-evidence or “the consciousness of an internal tribunal in human being (before which ‘his thoughts accuse and excuse each other’) (Kant).

Ethics on the other hand is based on natural principles/the life of man in a society of men/qualities of a good citizen. (As per Greek thought)

Both are consistent with each other. Both strive to find principles by which behavior can be judged objectively. Neither ethics nor morality can be reduced to mere linguistic usages or as ‘mores, customs, manners etc.

2. Does conscience plays any role within moral judgments?

Both religious commands & legal authority target conscience as owning responsibility for criminal actions. One can critically attack Kant’s notion of conscience as ‘self-evidence’ as a testimony to moral commands. Such a testimony is scrupulous because it is located inside the body of the individual and is unapproachable for objective inspection by others. Treating self-testimony at par with an objective fact (same as 2+2=4) is incorrect since there is no way for any person other than the individual himself/herself to justify such a testimony apart from relying on ‘belief’.

A critique of religious ethics is that the salvation promised through divine commands bears no accountability in this world for the promises of a metaphysical world. Notwithstanding the nature of conscience is subjective (even an atheist or a murderer has a conscience). Moreover, conscience has ‘feeling good’ as its object and not ‘doing good’. It is about justifying one’s conduct to one’s own self and not to others. Following this we can conclude that conscience cannot be relied upon in making objective moral judgments. Having detached moral judgments from religious & legal authority, we now come to the question: what be basis of judging right and wrong actions?

3. Is there any natural basis of moral values common to all human beings?

There exists a general consensus that life is the ground for all values or values are for a good life. There is no hierarchy between ‘Life’ as more fundamental value than other virtues. Values are not free floating. They are enmeshed in the life of an individual. Similarly life as mere ‘sustenance and procreation’ does not have any meaning. A life lived for various stakes involved in it (greatness & fame in pre-Socratic times; Permanence of the City; health of the soul, freedom, justice, etc) becomes meaningful & valuable. This is the basis of all human life. No human cohabitation can exist without a sustained system of values whatsoever.

4. The problem of Functionalism: With the fragmentation of responsibility within the institutions of the modern nation state, there was a sharing of responsibility by institutions collectively rather than by individuals employed by them. The individual acted as a ‘cog in the machine’. But this was not the case in legal jurisprudence. Legal system is based on two assumptions: i) personal responsibility & guilt ii) Belief in the functioning of the conscience (Arendt, 747). But this is a contradiction of the bureaucratic machinery of the system itself which on the one hand does not allow any space for individual conscience to operate in the mechanistic events of its operation and on the other hand interrogates individual conscience in case of any aberration or accidents in the running of the system. This is the fallacy of a complex question having two component parts 1) The accidents have nothing to do with the intention of any individual members 2)

Individual responsibility and guilt is negated by the system.

There points to a critical distinction between legality and morality: obedience to laws is not the same as being honest to ourselves and to others.

5. Contrast between legal and moral issues: i) both legal and moral concerns have in common ‘that they deal with persons and not with systems or organizations’ (Arendt, 747).

This is a contradiction in modern societies. Modern democratic states base the bureaucratic machinery in a ‘chance pattern of circumstances’ wherein anyone can be accidentally accused of any indirect violence by the machinery at random. The system has violence inbuilt in it and allows it without seeking any consent from those who execute it. Secondly, it shares an ‘automatic shifting of responsibility’. In case of any achievements of any one person, the entire institution shares the credit. But in case of any legal discrepancy, this process moves the other way round; instead of accusing the whole system only the person who executed the action is accused. It reverses the functionality of modern bureaucratic systems-‘that you are not a man but a function of something and hence yourself an exchangeable thing rather than somebody’ (747). But can we treat human life as materially exchangeable goods or same as changing of table manners? The courts instead of questioning the rules of the such a system that treat human beings as ‘cogs’ or tropes to execute actions for which they have no ‘consent’ but to obey passively, ask not ‘how did this system function? But why did the defendant become a functionary in the organization?’ (748). It detaches the larger form of indirect violence by such systems from particular cases of crimes projected as individual actions while it is the system that instantiates them. Jurisprudence becomes a culprit in trying to save the face of such crimes through court proceedings against individual members and aiming at ‘exchanging of unfit cogs against fitter ones’ (748). Such discussions evaded any moral issues in not addressing them correctly. Moreover, the shared guilt of passive obedience by everyone further made them sympathize with the accused who like everyone merely executed mechanical commands without any intentions to do wrong. This led to further evasion of any moral values. So, the complex process of devaluation happens not once but twice here: first in accepting the treatment of being a ‘cog’ and then in not being able to make any moral judgment even after the crimes.

ii) Moral law is higher than any law of the land, whatever its source maybe divine commands or human reason: Moral knowledge located in the heart or rational mind along with sound judgment becomes the content of moral law.

Rational basis of moral laws in philosophy & religion: According to Kant: ‘All transgressions are exceptions that man is tempted to make from law’ (752). Anyone who does this is in ‘contradiction with one’s own reason’. This leads to ‘self-contempt’ and the fear of self hatred prevents one from doing such acts. But he also claimed that man can deceive and mendacity slips inevitably in beliefs. Therefore beliefs cannot be fit for ‘public justification of crimes’ (752).

Coming back once again to religious ethics: even in religious commands Aquinas reflects that ‘God commands Good because it is good’ (Arendt, 755) or as Spinoza viewed that even God cannot act outside the laws of nature and ‘the obligatory character of good for man is god’s command’ (755)

Arendt maintains that divine laws or laws of the land are in the form of imperatives whereas the laws of nature are obligatory. They are not necessitated by authority but by will.

It follows from the discussion above that there is a natural basis to ethics in the form of laws of nature that make ethics obligatory (unlike the imperative nature of moral commands within religious ethics or the laws of land which speak only as 'ought/must') for all human beings living with other human beings. We then come to ask: what is the role played by freedom or free will of the individual within such a constraining 'obligation' for ethics? One may not be necessitated to say 2+2=4 but one is obliged to say it out of the constraint from natural laws that is understandable even for an atheist or an anarchist. Does that mean that we are limited in our 'will' in not being able to 'will' anything outside the natural laws?

References: Arendt, Hannah. Some Questions on Moral Philosophy. Social Research Vol.61, No.4. (Winter 1994): 739-764.

Hannah Arendt and Franz Kafka:Howard Caygill's Paper

Recently, Howard Caygill came for a workshop titled 'Kafka:In Theory' hosted by SL&CS, JNU on 5^TH Feb, 2011. He invited responses following a discussion of his paper 'The Fate of the Pariah: Arendt and Kafka’s"Nature Theater of Oklahama"

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/college_literature/summary/v038/38.1.caygill.html.

Caygill makes the following points about the Editing/Publication of Kafka’s works:

1. The many 'philosophical & political interpretations' of Kafka's texts are based on a 'mistaken understanding of their order of composition' (Caygill,1): He claims that Kafka's texts have not been justly edited. His friend Max Brod misguided the readers by posthumously publishing the novels of his friend, Kafka in a wrong order i.e. The Trial (1925). The Castle (1926) and Amerika (1927). Nevertheless, Kafka wrote them in a reverse order i.e. following from Amerika ('The Lost one'- Brod changed the original title) to The Trial and The Castle in the end. He even accuses Arendt for mistranslating to defend the western concept of jurisprudence and also he suspects that she might have known the real ordering of his texts from his diaries which she had access to yet she misemployed Kafka’s works to fit her own political interpretations.

2. Kafka intentionally misplaced ‘Oklahama’ in the ‘Nature Theater of Oklahama’ which was corrected as Oklahoma by most editors: Caygill argues that Oklahama refers to the famous photograph titled ‘Oklahama Idyll’, his ‘main photographic resource’ for his novel ‘Amerika’& photograph titled ‘the Strange Fruit’ that was circulated on postcards during the time of Lincoln’s execution. They are inseparable from his visions of a history of injustice and necessary ‘accidents’.

This has two implications for the philosophical & political readings & interpretations

i) His dystopic visions in the novels ‘The Trial’ and ‘The Castle’ were perceived as a background to the last novel ‘Amerika’ wherein he presents a utopia which came to be interpreted as a progression from dystopias to a redemptive utopia in his works.

But this being the other way round, Caygill claims that Kafka did not present any positivist progression in his understanding of history moving toward a utopia but instead he contextualized his novels within a particular history of ‘accidents of skin color’ and a ‘history of racial oppression’, citing instances from black American lives parallel to that of jewish experience. The characters of his novels are disposed & homeless people who become a part of these accidents.

ii) Secondly, he critiques the system of justice: ‘The machine of execution is not organised in terms of a juridical logic of guilt and innocence but in terms of accidents of skin color and status.’ It only quantitatively distributes gulit as systemic and not as understood as a conscious questioning of anindividual’s responsibility in case of actions that he/she chooses intentionally. Kafka’s character suffer from a ‘guiltless guilt’, they fall in trap of a systemic accident and they must confess to this guilt. These accidents are necessary default as evident in the historical background. Caygill therby, finds Kafka as creating ‘a repertoir of new possibilities’ that can be forseen as ‘prophesies’ for a world marked by such a tension that is characteristically incommesurable with the existing laws. For him communism & fascism cannot live together and the tension gives rise to a revolution that will bring the ‘messiah’.

How does Hannah Arendt interpret Kafka?

Hannah Arendt interprets Kafka in her two essays: ‘The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition’ (1945) and ‘Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew’ (1946).

1. She argues that Kafka is an exemplary of a millitant pariah who claims his rights in an unjust world. He faces a constant struggle to choose between ‘pervenu assimilation’ in this ‘bureaucratic Castle’ and the individual pariah resistance in the ‘village’. He chooses for a world where ‘a simple man could achieve to live his own life like a normal human being’. Hannah calls him a ‘Zionist’ in his utopian vision for such a world which is contrary to a Nature theater where “ there is place for everyone” in accordance with his talents, his bent and his will’ (Caygill, 4). For Arendt, one can live ‘as a man only among men..only when a people lives and functions in consort with other people can it contribute to the establishment upon earth of a commonly conditioned and commonly controlled humanity’ ( italics added) ( qtd in Caygill, 4). Arendt points that ‘political transcendance of the individual pariah or pervenu’ will come in ‘the collective dream and struggle of a people’ (Caygill, 4). She anticipates Kafka for such a proposal but Caygill contradicts it by saying that he did not mean any communitarian collective dream but defended for a revolution.

2. She critiques ‘the law in terms of necessity’ as a just cause for rebellion in Kafka’s texts. ‘Amerika’ becomes a place of redemption from the ‘total domination’ of the functionality of law. She understands Kafka’s use of images and photographs as ‘blueprints’, an exercise in imagination that ‘enable the free exercise of imagination in reflective judgment’ (Caygill, 5) She interprets this reflective judgment in narrative and his use of photographs as various forms of imitation of ‘reality’ speaking to each other to judge ‘according to a sensus communis of shared narratives’. Caygill finds it ‘underestimating’ Kafka’s techniques as it does not emphasise the key link with a particular history captured in the photographs and narratives but he does not explain how? Arendt is infact defending the relevance of such alternative forms of experience but only within what is possible while living with others who may hold different views of the same experience. The sensus communis works only as a regulative ideal for the existence of life with others.

What is the problem with Caygill’s Argument?

Caygill’s main argument is that Kafka stood for a revolution that is ‘messiahnic’ not in its forecasts but as an outcome of the accumulation of ‘accidents of skin color’ in this context of a history of injustice both with the Black Americans and Jewish people. He is not ready to make any compromise with the existing communitarian dream and that is one of the reasons why he has strong reservations for accepting Kafka’s texts as presenting any utopias. For him any utopia or a collective dream is incommensurate with the modern times which are replete with a history of such ‘accidents’.

This argument does not provide anything different from what Hannah Arendt is arguing. Although she uses the word ‘utopia’ for Kafka’s texts yet she accepts his techniques as significant in making judgments which are possible only within an inter-subjective exchange of different views. Caygill misunderstands it as defending ‘western jurisprudence’ and continuing with ‘the judicial logic of innocent and guilty’. But in her last book ‘The Life of the Mind’, where Arendt clearly defines the processes involved in political action; she explains critical thinking as ‘anti-authoritative’ and it is through imagination that one makes a relationship with the past where a ‘wrong’ has been committed and we judge it as ‘right or wrong’ and act to protect from such mistakes in future. For her one cannot judge ‘backwards’ since it is similar to revenge which is never satisfied and is equivalent to ‘suicide’ because it is against life itself. So, even if Kafka is placed in a history of wrongs, his narratives are a conscious attempt of establishing a relation with wrongs by emphasising the wrongs not as ‘accidents’ but as ‘necessary’ and inevitable outcomes of a flawed system. Caygill defends for a ‘crisis’ in Kafka’s novels that call for the establishment of new laws. But to put Arendt’s question to him: What is the basis of this crisis? Is it the law or is the misuse of law in favor of ‘accidents of color’? Can we create separate laws for people with different colors of skin? Arendt argues that laws are only reference points which cannot be interpreted literally. They are there to preserve the ‘truth’ and not otherwise. A sensus communis is integral for any social formation and without which we can live only on ‘I-lands’ but can we call it a ‘life’ where everything is an extension of one’s own ‘self’. How can one assure that living within a people of same color will not eventually lead to some form of ‘accidents’. Caygill’s argument sounds exclusive in this sense. And if he also has the same connotation as Arendt's then it defeats the argument that Hannah has mis-employed Kafka's texts.

Although the ordering of texts does not make any difference for his claims yet he does not specify his source from where he has derived this information. Since the original diaries of Kafka are not accessible. Besides, if it was already clear in the diaries then it seems ridiculous to understand that Arendt would have mis-translated despite of knowing.